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An Empirical Study of the Effect of Shady Grove v. Allstate  
on Forum Shopping in the New York Courts 
William H.J. Hubbard† 
Given the considerable prominence of forum-shopping concerns in 
the jurisprudence and academic literature on the so-called Erie Doc-
trine, courts and commentators may benefit from data on whether, 
and to what extent, forum shopping in fact responds to choice-of-law 
decisions under the Erie Doctrine. Prior to this paper, however, no 
empirical study quantified the changes in forum shopping behavior 
caused by a court decision applying the Erie Doctrine. I study changes 
in filing patterns of cases likely to be affected by the Supreme Court’s 
recent decision in Shady Grove v. Allstate and find evidence of large 
shifts in the patterns of original filings and removals in federal courts 
in New York that are consistent with the predicted forum shopping re-
sponse to Shady Grove. In addition to providing the first empirical ev-
idence of vertical forum shopping induced by a decision applying the 
Erie doctrine, this paper seeks to serve as a proof of concept for empiri-
cal research in this area. While there are significant obstacles to em-
pirical research on the effects of Erie and its progeny, this paper out-
lines a methodology that may be feasible for future projects in this ar-
ea. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the Erie case itself,1 the so-called Erie Doctrine2 has been 
preoccupied with concerns about the “injustice” of vertical forum 
shopping.3 In Erie, Justice Brandeis began his broadside against the 
doctrine of Swift v. Tyson4 by raising the specter of vertical forum 
shopping, as embodied in the notorious Black & White Taxicab case.5 
Hanna v. Plumer famously characterized “discouragement of forum-
shopping” as one of “the twin aims of the Erie rule.”6 And even though 
Hanna distinguished cases implicating the Rules of Decision Act (to 
which Erie applies) from cases implicating the Rules Enabling Act (to 
which Erie does not apply), subsequent cases involving the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure and state law have continue to struggle with 
concerns about vertical forum shopping, whether or not they are, 
strictly speaking, Erie cases rather than Hanna cases.7  
1 Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
2 I say “so-called” because of the ambiguity surrounding exactly what one is 
referring to when one intones the words “Erie Doctrine.” For example, as Al-
lan Erbsen explains in an article appearing in this volume, even the ramifica-
tions of Erie itself are best understood as a bundle of no less than four dis-
tinct doctrines. Allan Erbsen, Erie’s Four Functions and the Fragmentation of 
Doctrine, ____. For purposes of this paper, I simply mean to refer to the hold-
ings of Erie and the cases that, by their terms, follow it. I include Hanna and 
its progeny, including Shady Grove, although one might distinguish them as 
Rules Enabling Act cases rather than Rules of Decision Act cases.  
3 304 U.S. at 76. By “vertical forum shopping,” I mean the selective choice of 
federal versus state court to gain a strategic advantage in litigation. In con-
trast, “horizontal forum shopping” would refer to selectively choosing among 
state courts for the most favorable forum. Although “forum shopping” usually 
has a negative connotation, this paper takes no position on whether any par-
ticular type of forum shopping is desirable or undesirable. 
4 41 U.S. 1 (1842). 
5 As characterized by the Erie Court, in Black & White Taxicab, the plaintiff 
corporation reincorporated in a new state for the purpose of manufacturing 
diversity in order to benefit from more favorable federal law that would be 
available in federal court, thanks to the doctrine of Swift. Erie, 304 U.S. at 
73–74 (citing Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxi-
cab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928)). 
6 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965). 
7 See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 40 (1988) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (“This significant encouragement to forum shopping is alone suffi-
cient to warrant application of state law.”); Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Mar-
tin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508–09 (2001) (“[A]ny other rule would produce the 
sort of forum-shopping . . . and . . . inequitable administration of the laws 
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Further, numerous scholars have argued that the Erie Doctrine 
involves a trade-off between vertical and horizontal forum shopping: 
when federal courts employ state rules, they discourage vertical forum 
shopping but encourage horizontal forum shopping, which takes ad-
vantage of courts’ tendency under modern conflicts-of-law rules to em-
ploy forum law.8 Judgments about whether the Erie Doctrine repre-
sents good policy therefore turn, in part, on the relative benefits and 
harms from vertical and horizontal forum shopping.9 
All of this suggests that the contours of the Erie Doctrine may (or 
should) depend on the extent to which forum shopping in fact responds 
to choice-of-law decisions under the Erie Doctrine. Yet in the 75 years 
following the Erie decision, there has not been (to my knowledge) a 
single empirical study quantifying how vertical forum shopping re-
sponded to a decision applying the Erie Doctrine. This paper presents 
the first such study.  
This paper makes use of recently released administrative data on 
case filings in federal court, supplemented by a unique data set of 
complaints filed in New York federal court, to quantify the changes in 
that Erie seeks to avoid.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Salve Regina 
College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 234 (1991) (“The twin aims of the Erie doc-
trine—discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable ad-
ministration of the laws—are components of the goal of doctrinal coherence 
advanced by independent appellate review.”) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted); Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 
(1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“What seems to me far more likely to produce 
forum shopping is the consistent difference between the state and federal ap-
pellate standards, which the Court leaves untouched.”). 
8 See, e.g., Michael S. Greve, THE UPSIDE-DOWN CONSTITUTION 234 (Harvard 
2012) (“[T]his regime encourages relentless forum shopping for hospitable 
state venues.”); Patrick J. Borchers, The Real Risk of Forum Shopping: A 
Dissent from Shady Grove, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 29, 30 (2010) (noting that 
horizontal forum shopping has become a greater problem since Erie); Samuel 
Issacharoff, Settled Expectations in a World of Unsettled Law: Choice of Law 
after the Class Action Fairness Act, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1839, 1854–56 (2006) 
(noting that horizontal uniformity in law is undermined by strict adherence 
to vertical uniformity in choice of law). Compare Joseph P. Bauer, The Erie 
Doctrine Revisited: How a Conflicts Perspective Can Aid the Analysis, 74 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1235, 1281 (1999) (arguing that horizontal and vertical 
forum shopping do not raise equally serious concerns). 
9 Academic commentary has also argued that for the Rules Enabling Act 
analysis under Hanna, “the risk of vertical forum shopping [may be] so great 
that substitution of the federal rule for the state does indeed ‘abridge, enlarge 
or modify any substantive right’ in contravention of the Rules Enabling Act.” 
Patrick J. Borchers, The Real Risk of Forum Shopping: A Dissent from Shady 
Grove, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 29, 33 (2010). 
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filing and removal patterns among cases whose claims were likely to 
have been affected by the Supreme Court’s decision in Shady Grove v. 
Allstate.10 I predict a rise in federal-court filings by plaintiffs and a 
decline in removals to federal court by defendants following the Shady 
Grove decision. The data largely confirm these predictions; this paper 
demonstrates the results both graphically and statistically.  
This empirical evidence supports what has long been believed on 
the basis of anecdotal evidence: court decisions applying the Erie Doc-
trine induce changes in choice of forum by both plaintiffs and defend-
ants. Further, the evidence suggests that the changes in forum choice 
induced by Shady Grove were fairly dramatic in terms of magnitude. 
At least in this one context, it appears that vertical forum shopping is 
not a de minimus concern for judges or policymakers.  
In addition to providing the first empirical evidence of vertical fo-
rum shopping induced by a decision applying the Erie doctrine, this 
paper seeks to serve as a proof of concept for empirical research in this 
area. While there are significant obstacles to empirical research on the 
effects of Erie and its progeny, this paper outlines a methodology that 
may be feasible for future projects in this area. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Part I briefly re-
views the Shady Grove decision and its expected effects on vertical fo-
rum shopping. Part II reviews empirical research on related questions 
of choice of law and forum shopping. Part III outlines the data and 
methodology employed. Part IV presents results. 
I. SHADY GROVE AND VERTICAL FORUM SHOPPING 
Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates was a medical care provider 
that submitted insurance claims to Allstate. Allstate paid the claims, 
but paid them late, and it refused to pay the 2 percent per month in-
terest rate on late benefits payments required by New York Insurance 
Law § 5106(a) (“Section 5106(a)”).11 Shady Grove then brought suit 
against Allstate to recover the unpaid statutory interest. It filed the 
suit in the Eastern District of New York, invoking the diversity juris-
diction of the federal court. The suit was a putative class action, seek-
ing to sue on behalf of everyone to whom Allstate owes statutory in-
terest under Section 5106(a).12 
10 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 130 S. 
Ct. 1431 (2010). 
11 130 S. Ct. at 1436. 
12 130 S. Ct. at 1436–37. 
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Shady Grove’s individual claim was for only a small sum (approx-
imately $500), so the linchpin to its litigation strategy was certifica-
tion of a class action. The complication here was that New York law 
prohibits class certification of claims for statutory damages, such as 
the statutory interest awarded under Section 5106(a).13 New York Civ-
il Practice Law § 901(b) (“Section 901(b)”) states, “Unless a statute 
creating or imposing a penalty, or a minimum measure of recovery 
specifically authorizes the recovery thereof in a class action, an action 
to recover a penalty, or minimum measure of recovery created or im-
posed by statute may not be maintained as a class action.” 
This presented an Erie/Hanna question: Given that Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 23 provides criteria for the certification of a class 
action, is a federal court sitting in diversity bound by Section 901(b) in 
a case seeking class certification of claims for statutory damages un-
der New York law? The district court and the Second Circuit held Sec-
tion 901(b) applied in a federal diversity suit. The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari and reversed.  
While no opinion commanded a majority of the Court, five justices 
agreed that Section 901(b) could not apply in federal court. In the 
wake of Shady Grove, lower courts have noted its application to statu-
tory damages regimes under New York law other than Section 
5106(a).14 Indeed, there are a number of provisions under the New 
York General Business Law and the New York Labor Law that pro-
vide for statutory damages in one form or another.15 
13 130 S. Ct. at 1437. 
14 See Pefanis v. Westway Diner, Inc., No. 08-cv-00002, 2010 WL 3564426, *7 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2010) (holding that after Shady Grove, plaintiffs may “now 
seek liquidated damages authorized by [New York Labor Law §§ 198(1-a), 
663(1)] as part of a Rule 23 class action in federal court”); McBeth v. Gabrielli 
Truck Sales, Ltd., No. 09-cv-04112, 2010 WL 3081534 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2010) 
(allowing amendment to class action complaint to add claim for liquidated 
damages under Labor Law § 663(1) pursuant to Shady Grove). 
15 See, e.g., N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349(h) (“[A]ny person who has been injured 
by reason of any violation of this section may bring . . . an action to recover 
his actual damages or fifty dollars, whichever is greater, or both such actions. 
The court may, in its discretion, increase the award of damages to an amount 
not to exceed three times the actual damages up to one thousand dollars, if 
the court finds the defendant willfully or knowingly violated this section.”); 
N.Y. Lab. Law § 198(1-a) (“In any action instituted in the courts upon a wage 
claim by an employee . . . in which the employee prevails, the court shall al-
low such employee to recover the full amount of any underpayment, all rea-
sonable attorney’s fees, prejudgment interest as required under the civil 
practice law and rules, and, unless the employer proves a good faith basis to 
believe that its underpayment of wages was in compliance with the law, an 
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Notably, the issue of forum shopping was squarely in the Supreme 
Court’s sights as it decided Shady Grove. The plurality in Shady Grove 
expressly noted what they perceived as the likely effect of the Court’s 
decision:  
We must acknowledge the reality that keeping the federal-
court door open to class actions that cannot proceed in state 
court will produce forum shopping. . . . But divergence from 
state law, with the attendant consequence of forum shopping, 
is the inevitable (indeed, one might say the intended) result of 
a uniform system of federal procedure.16 
Scholars, too, have been quick to predict that “the Shady Grove de-
cision will encourage federal forum shopping by plaintiffs to avoid the 
limiting effects of state provisions that prohibit certain types of class 
actions.”17 Practitioners18 and even New York state court judges19 
have concurred in this prediction. Nonetheless, this view is not quite 
unanimous.20 
additional amount as liquidated damages equal to one hundred percent of the 
total amount of the wages found to be due.”). 
16 See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1447–48 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion). 
17 Linda S. Mullenix, Federal Class Actions: A Near-Death Experience in A 
Shady Grove, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 448, 479–80 (2011). See also Kevin M. 
Clermont, The Repressible Myth of Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 987, 
1028 (2011) (“[Shady Grove] will produce forum shopping, as the federal 
courts become more hospitable to class actions than some states.”); Elizabeth 
Guidi, Shady Grove: Class Actions in the Context of Erie, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 
783, 811 (2012) (“The Court’s decision in Shady Grove . . . violates the twin 
aims of Erie because it will increase forum shopping and the inequitable dis-
tribution of the laws.”). 
18 See Aaron D. Van Oort & Eileen M. Hunter, Shady Grove v. Allstate: A 
Case Study in Formalism Versus Pragmatism, 11 ENGAGE 105, 109 (Sept. 
2010) (“As the dissent emphasizes, the plurality’s formalist approach—and 
the concurrence’s measured formalist approach as applied in this case—will 
increase forum-shopping . . . .”). 
19 See Thomas A. Dickerson, John M. Leventhal, Cheryl E. Chambers, New 
York State Consumer Protection Law and Class Actions in 2010,  N.Y. ST. B.J. 
38, 41 (May 2011) (“Clearly, there will be an increase in federal class actions 
and defendants may be less anxious to remove such cases to federal court un-
der the Class Action Fairness Act.”). The Hon. Thomas A. Dickerson, Hon. 
John M. Leventhal, and Hon. Cheryl E. Chambers are Associate Justices of 
the New York Appellate Division, Second Department. 
20 See W. Daniel “Dee” Miles, III, et al., Shady Grove v. Allstate: An Erie Se-
quel(?) and Its Effects Moving Forward, SS015 ALI-ABA 183, 190 (2010) (ar-
guing that Shady Grove will not necessarily increase class action filings and 
                                                                                                                    
29-Apr-13] Draft: Empirical Study of Shady Grove 7 
II. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON FORUM SHOPPING 
To my knowledge, this is the first empirical study of the effect of 
the Erie Doctrine on vertical forum shopping. There have been, how-
ever, various efforts at the theoretical and empirical study of choice of 
law and forum shopping more generally. Most closely related is the 
handful of studies that have attempted to identify empirical patterns 
in vertical forum shopping, though not in the Erie context. Specifical-
ly, studies have focused on the strategic use of filing in state court by 
plaintiffs and of removal by defense attorneys.21 
A related literature examines empirical evidence of horizontal fo-
rum shopping,22 explores the causes of horizontal forum shopping,23 
noting that “[a contrary outcome in Shady Grove] would have done little to 
stop class-action lawsuits from occurring in total . . . .”). 
21 See Kevin M. Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really 
Reveal Anything about the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdic-
tion, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 581 (1998) (observing plaintiff win rates of 71 per-
cent in original diversity cases but 34 percent in removed diversity cases); 
Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum Choices in Removal Cases Under 
Diversity and Federal Question Jurisdiction, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 369 (1992) 
(analyzing a national sample of attorneys in removal cases on their forum 
selection decisions and views of the federal judiciary). 
22 See Ahmed E. Taha, Judge Shopping: Testing Whether Judges’ Political 
Orientations Affect Case Filings, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1007 (2010) (finding that 
differences in the political orientation of judges across federal district courts 
lead to differences in the filing rates of certain categories of cases); Scott E. 
Atkinson, Alan C. Marco, John L. Turner, The Economics of a Centralized 
Judiciary: Uniformity, Forum Shopping, and the Federal Circuit, 52 J. LAW & 
ECON. 411 (2009) (estimating extent of forum shopping in patent cases before 
and after establishment of the Federal Circuit); James D. Cox, Randall S. 
Thomas, and Lynn Bai, Do Differences in Pleadings Standards Cause Forum 
Shopping in Securities Class Actions?: Doctrinal and Empirical Analyses, 
2009 WISC. L. REV. 421 (finding weak evidence of forum shopping). See also 
Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 CORNELL 
L. REV. 481 (2011) (providing an empirical examination of trends in transna-
tional forum shopping). 
23 Theodore Eisenberg and Lynn M. LoPucki, Shopping for Judges: An Em-
pirical Analysis of Venue Choice in Large Chapter 11 Reorganizations,” 84 
CORNELL L. REV. 967 (1999) (attempting to explain patterns of forum shop-
ping in the context of bankruptcy actions from 1980–1997); Kevin M. Cler-
mont and Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of Forum Shopping, 80 
CORNELL L. REV. 1507 (1995) (finding that plaintiffs prevail much less often 
in federal cases that are transferred than cases adjudicated in the forum in 
which the plaintiff filed). 
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studies the use of choice-of-forum clauses,24 and looks for empirical 
evidence of possible effects of horizontal forum shopping.25 Other work 
provides theoretical models of strategic forum shopping decisions.26 
An important methodological difference between this study and 
most of this literature is that I use a discrete change in a legal rule to 
identify the causal relationship between the legal rule and litigant be-
havior. Almost none of the studies cited above were designed to do 
this.27 While this approach is not always feasible, it has the advantage 
of allowing one to compare the behavior of litigants in the same types 
of cases and in the same courts but under two different legal rules. To 
this extent, the approach taken by this study controls for the charac-
teristics of a given set of cases and court. With this in mind, I turn 
now to a description of my datasets and methodology. 
III. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
This study seeks to shed light on the larger question of the rela-
tionships between the Erie Doctrine and forum shopping. This larger 
question, though, frames an entire research agenda, to which this pa-
per can only make an initial contribution. The precise question this 
paper asks is a narrow one:  What effect did the Supreme Court’s deci-
24 See Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to New York: An 
Empirical Study of Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in Publicly-
Held Companies’ Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475 (2009) (analyzing a da-
ta set of 2,882 contracts for choice of law and choice of forum clauses); Chris-
topher R. Drahozal, Contracting Out of National Law: An Empirical Look at 
the New Law Merchant, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 523 (2005) (examining why 
so few parties contract out of national law in international transactions). 
25 See Michelle J. White, Asbestos Litigation: Procedural Innovations and Fo-
rum Shopping, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 365 (2006) (examining empirically the ef-
fect of forum choice on case outcomes). 
26 Debra Lyn Bassett, The Forum Game, 84 N.C. L. Rev. 333 (2006) (charac-
terizing and modeling forum choice decisions as a strategic game). 
27 An example of a study that takes something similar to this approach is At-
kinson, Marco, and Turner’s examination of filing patterns before and after 
the change in the appellate structure of the federal district courts brought on 
by the creation of the Federal Circuit. Scott E. Atkinson, Alan C. Marco, John 
L. Turner, The Economics of a Centralized Judiciary: Uniformity, Forum 
Shopping, and the Federal Circuit, 52 J. LAW & ECON. 411 (2009). Taha’s pa-
per on forum shopping in response to judges’ political orientations also uses 
an empirical strategy that exploits within-district variation over time. Ahmed 
E. Taha, Judge Shopping: Testing Whether Judges’ Political Orientations Af-
fect Case Filings, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1007 (2010). There may be some concern 
about endogeneity of the variation in that context, however. 
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sion in Shady Grove have on the rates at which plaintiffs filed in fed-
eral court, and defendants removed to federal court, putative class ac-
tions seeking statutory damages under New York law? 
Shady Grove, as an exposition of the current state of the Erie Doc-
trine, is hardly transparent. The Court offers three separate opinions, 
none of which command a majority of justices, and each of which pre-
sents a different vision of how to go about deciding the dispute. But for 
purposes of the empirical question this paper poses, however, the deci-
sion is crystal clear: on March 31, 2010, the Supreme Court held that 
Rule 23 applied, and Section 901(b) did not apply, to diversity cases 
raising claims for statutory damages under New York law in federal 
court. Just as crucially, this decision reversed the contrary judgment 
of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.  
As a consequence, on March 31, 2010, there was a sharp break in 
the applicable choice-of-law rule for diversity cases brought under 
New York law seeking statutory damages and class certification. Be-
fore March 31, 2010, Section 901(b) applied in federal court. After 
March 31, 2010, it did not.28 I utilize this clear break in the applica-
tion of the Erie Doctrine in New York federal courts to identify how 
patterns of forum shopping respond to that application of the Erie 
Doctrine. My methodology, in essence, is to examine the patterns of 
putative, diversity-jurisdiction class action filings in New York federal 
courts. I compare the rates at which plaintiff file in, and defendants 
remove to, federal court before and after March 31, 2010. 
To the extent that Shady Grove has affected vertical forum shop-
ping, one should expect not only to see changes in filing rates, but 
28 Between May 4, 2009, when the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 
Shady Grove, and March 31, 2010, the future status of Section 901(b) in fed-
eral court was more uncertain, due to the pending, rather than final, status of 
the Shady Grove litigation. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. All-
state Ins. Co., 129 S. Ct. 2160 (2009) (granting certiorari). Nonetheless, so 
long as the decision of the Supreme Court was not a foregone conclusion, 
March 31, 2010 represents a sharp break in judges’ and practitioners’ under-
standings of whether Section 901(b) would apply in federal court. In this re-
spect, the close vote in the Shady Grove decision supports the inference that 
the outcome of the case was uncertain prior to March 31, 2010. Attorneys and 
judges would have had difficulty predicting the outcome of Shady Grove and 
adjusting their behavior in anticipation of the decision prior to March 31, 
2010. Of course, the closeness of the Supreme Court decision is not necessary 
for such an inference (nor might it be sufficient), and I have argued elsewhere 
that in some circumstances even a fairly lopsided Supreme Court decision 
can come as a shock and surprise to both the bar and the bench. See William 
H.J. Hubbard, Testing for Change in Procedural Standards, with Application 
to Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 42 J Legal Stud. (forthcoming 2013).  
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changes in a predictable direction. In this regard, I assume that in 
most cases involving statutory damages claims, plaintiffs prefer class 
treatment and defendants do not.29  
First, Shady Grove should make plaintiffs’ attorneys more willing 
to file their cases in federal court rather than state court. Original fil-
ings in federal court—i.e., cases that are initially filed in federal court 
rather than removed to federal court—should rise after the Shady 
Grove decision. 
Second, to the extent that putative class actions are still filed in 
state court, defendant in state court will be less willing than before to 
remove these cases to federal court. This change in attitude should 
show up in the data as a decline in the number of cases that enter the 
federal court system by way of removal from state courts. 
To test these hypotheses I bring to bear two related data sets. My 
primary data set is composed of administrative data on cases filed in 
federal court compiled by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts 
(“AO”) and made available to the public on a restricted use basis.30 
This data (“AO Data”) contains basic information, such as filing date, 
jurisdictional basis, nature of suit category, and district of filing, for 
every case filed in federal court. 
From the AO Data, I draw a data set of cases most likely to involve 
the same types of claims as Shady Grove—statutory damages claims 
under New York law invoking diversity jurisdiction. I will refer to this 
data set as the Administrative Dataset. It is impossible, though, to 
determine from the AO Data whether or not New York law applies in 
a particular case, let alone whether the plaintiff is seeking statutory 
damages or whether Section 901(b) might be implicated. Thus, my 
goal in creating the Administrative Dataset was identify a set of cases 
most similar to the Shady Grove case itself, and thus plausibly more 
29 In Shady Grove the plaintiffs invoked federal jurisdiction under the Class 
Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”), see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), arguing that 
their putative class action was a diversity suit in which the damages sought 
exceeded $5 million. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P A. v. Allstate Ins. 
Co., 466 F. Supp. 2d 467, 469 (E.D. N.Y. 2006). While CAFA is largely struc-
tured to ensure greater access to federal court for class-action defendants, it 
clearly favors plaintiffs when Section 901(b) would otherwise apply in state 
court. 
30 See Federal Judicial Center, Federal Court Cases: Integrated Database 
Series. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social 
Research [distributor]. For codebooks and information on this database se-
ries, see http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/series/00072. 
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likely to involve statutory damages claims under New York law. To do 
this, I focused on cases with the following characteristics:31  
1. were filed in federal court in New York;32 
2. brought by a represented party;33 
3. invoked either original diversity jurisdiction or removal diver-
sity jurisdiction;34 
4. were not reopenings of earlier-filed cases or appeals from ad-
ministrative proceedings;35 
5. were coded as cases involving either contract law generally, in-
surance, or fraud;36 and 
6. were filed in the period from November 19, 2008 through Sep-
tember 30, 2010. This represents the time from the Second Cir-
cuit decision in Shady Grove37 through six months after the 
Shady Grove decision, which is the latest date for which com-
plete federal court filing data is available.38 
31 For the purpose of facilitating replication of this study, footnotes 32–41 re-
fer to variable names in the AO Data and the numerical codes for the indicat-
ed values of those variables. Further details on the AO data and methods for 
processing this data are provided in William H.J. Hubbard, Testing for 
Change in Procedural Standards, with Application to Bell Atlantic v. 
Twombly, 42 J Legal Stud. (forthcoming 2013). The working paper version is 
available online on SSRN or at http://home.uchicago.edu/~whhubbar/. 
32 This corresponds to district codes 06 through 09 for the four districts in 
New York. 
33 I excluded observations coded as pro se or in forma pauperis in the varia-
bles prose and ifp, respectively. 
34 This corresponds to jurisdiction code 4 (“diversity of citizenship”). 
35 This corresponds to origin codes 1 (“original proceeding”) and 2 (“removed 
from state court”). 
36 This corresponds to natureofsuit codes 110 (“insurance”), 190 (“other con-
tract”), and 370 (“other fraud”). I also included in the scope of the database 
codes 371 (“truth in lending”), 480 (“consumer credit”), 690 (‘other forfeiture 
and penalty suits”), and 890 (“other statutory actions”), but no observations 
fell within these categories, presumably because most cases in these catego-
ries are brought under federal question jurisdiction and invoke federal stat-
utes. 
37 Shady Grove Orthopedics, P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 549 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 
2008), rev’d 559 U.S. 393 (2010). 
38 Filing date information was derived from the variables fileyear, filemonth, 
and fileday. While a longer time period after Shady Grove would be ideal, the 
AO Data currently available provides complete data on filed cases only 
through September 30, 2010. 
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I focus on insurance, contract, and fraud cases because these appear to 
be the most likely to involve claims similar to those in Shady Grove. 
Shady Grove itself involved a claim arising out of an alleged breach of 
contract and New York insurance law, and consumer fraud is an area 
in which statutory causes of action often provide for statutory damag-
es.39 
 
TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS, ADMINISTRATIVE DATASET40 







     
Number of  
Observations 573 799 711 662 
     
Class  
Allegation 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.06 
     
Original  
Jurisdiction 0.85 0.84 0.80 0.85 
     
Insurance 0.16 0.19 0.23 0.20 
Other Contract 0.79 0.74 0.72 0.74 
Fraud 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.07 
     
 
I further divide the Administrative Dataset into two groups of cas-
es: a “treatment” group of cases coded as involving class action allega-
tions and a “control” group of cases sharing all of the characteristics of 
the treatment group other than putative class action status.41 Because 
Section 901(b) and Rule 23 affect only putative class actions, the 
treatment group may be affected by Shady Grove, while the control 
group will not be.42 Summary statistics for the Administrative Dataset 
appear in Table 1.  
39 For citations to relevant New York law, see notes 11–15 and accompanying 
text. 
40 Values in all rows other than “Number of Observations” represent shares. 
41 Putative class action status was derived from the classaction variable. 
42 Note that the predictions above assume that the underlying rate at which 
plaintiffs’ attorneys have the opportunity to file cases does not change dra-
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My second dataset supplements the first. One weakness of the AO 
Data, as noted above, is that it does not contain sufficient information 
to determine whether Section 901(b) is actually implicated in a given 
case. Rather, the Administrative Dataset relies only on proxies for 
cases most similar to Shady Grove.43 In addition, past research has 
found that the classaction variable was less reliably coded than other 
variables.44 For these reasons, I created a second dataset of infor-
mation drawn from individual, human review of a sample of com-
plaints (and notices of removal) from cases in the Administrative Da-
taset. This data constitutes what I will refer to as the Complaints 
Subset.  
With the assistance of a team of research assistants, I conducted 
automated word searches and individualized, manual review of repre-
sentative samples of complaints and notices of removal from cases in 
the Administrative Dataset to identify complaints in which (1) the 
plaintiff was clearly alleging that class certification was appropriate 
and/or (2) the plaintiff was clearly making a claim for statutory dam-
ages under New York law.  
 
matically at around the time of the Shady Grove decision. If, however, there 
simply were not any statutory damages claims to bring in the months follow-
ing Shady Grove, one would not see an increase in federal-court filings even if 
plaintiffs’ attorneys became more willing to file in federal court. To address 
this concern, I use a difference-in-differences (“diff-in-diff”) empirical strate-
gy. This approach relies on a second, “control” group of cases similar to the 
treatment group, such that trends over time in the filings rates of the two 
groups are likely to be similar. Rather than only looking at the change in fil-
ing rates of treatment group cases after Shady Grove (the “difference”), I also 
compare the change in treatment group cases after Shady Grove with the 
change in control group cases (the “difference-in-differences”). 
43 It is important to note here that this measurement error in the Adminis-
trative Dataset leads to untreated observations being coded as belonging to 
the treatment group. Consequently, the bias introduced by the measurement 
error is attenuation bias, i.e., bias toward a finding of no effect. Below, I re-
port statistically significant effects on forum shopping consistent with the 
predictions above. Given the likely attenuation bias in the Administrative 
Dataset, the actual effects on vertical forum shopping may be even larger 
than estimated. 
44 Thomas E. Willging, et al., Empirical Study of Class Actions in Four Fed-
eral District Courts: Final Report to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 
198–199 (Federal Judicial Center 1996) (examining class action codes for pe-
riod 1989–1994). 
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TABLE 2: SUMMARY STATISTICS, COMPLAINTS SUBSET45 
 Dec. 2008 –  Mar. 2010 
Apr. 2010 –  
Sept. 2010 
   
No. of Observations 94 21 
   
Class Allegation 0.32 0.19 
   
Original Jurisdiction 0.26 0.24 
   
Statutory Damages 0.22 0.19 
Insurance  0.24 0.48 
Other Contract 0.71 0.52 
Fraud 0.04 0.00 
   
 
For this reason, the Complaints Subset represents a subsample of 
the Administrative Dataset for which I have high confidence that the 
treatment-group cases involved statutory damages and class-action 
allegations. This attempts to counterbalance the risk that the “treat-
ment” group in the Administrative Data is over-inclusive, in that it 
contains cases not involving class action allegations or statutory dam-
ages. It creates the converse risk, however, of a sample that includes 
far fewer cases than actually were affected by Shady Grove.46 The 
small sample size of the Complaints Subset means that this data has 
little statistical power. Thus, I rely on it to supplement the Adminis-
trative Dataset but do not subject it to regression analysis. Notably, 
45 Values in all rows other than “Number of Observations” represent shares. 
Note that this dataset is heavily skewed toward removed cases relative to the 
Administrative dataset as a whole. This reflects deliberate effort to over-
sample removed cases due to the relative infrequency of removed class action 
cases involving statutory damages. Despite this oversampling, we were una-
ble to find any removed, putative class action involving statutory damages 
claims after Shady Grove. 
46 Note that under federal pleading rules, there is no requirement that the 
original complaint allege that the plaintiff will seek class certification, nor 
that the plaintiff clearly distinguish claims for statutory damages from 
claims for actual, nominal, or punitive damages. 
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model. I report marginal effects, rather than estimation coefficients, so 
that the negative binomial results are comparable to the OLS re-
sults.48 The results are robust, insofar as the estimates in Column 2 
are nearly identical to those in Column 1. 
 
TABLE 3: CLASS-ONLY REGRESSION RESULTS,  
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION CASES, ADMINISTRATIVE DATASET49 
Model (1) OLS (2) NB (3) OLS (4) NB 
Scope All NY All NY SD NY SD NY  














District FE Y Y NA NA 
Constant 0.438 (0.261)  
1.482 
(0.747)  
N 88 88 22 22 
 
A related concern with the estimates in Column 1 is the fact that 
for most district-month observations for districts other than the 
Southern District of New York, the number of filings is zero.50 Thus, 
the Southern District may be the only district with sufficiently regular 
class-action practice to support statistical inferences about class ac-
tions. For this reason, Columns 3 and 4 repeat the analysis from the 
given that most counts in this data were at or close to zero, this may not be 
the case here. 
48 Results using a Poisson or zero-inflated Poisson model were quite similar 
for all specifications reported herein, although the zero-inflated Poisson failed 
to converge for some specifications. 
49 Note: * and ** denote statistical significance at the 5 percent and 1 percent 
levels, respectively. OLS indicates ordinary least squares regression and NB 
indicates negative binomial regression. For negative binomial regressions, 
marginal effects are reported. 
50 Only four district-month observations outside the Southern District have 
non-zero values for class action filings. 
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first two columns, but restrict the data to observations in the South-
ern District. Once again, the effects are highly significant. For the 
Southern District, Shady Grove appears to have tripled the rate of fil-
ings—a huge effect, but not surprising given Figure 4. 
A third and final concern with relying on the straightforward OLS 
results in Table 3 is the fact that it may be desirable to compare the 
changes for putative class actions in the Administrative Dataset with 
a “control” group in order to control for any changes in filing patterns 
over time that are caused by unobserved factors. To account for this 
possibility, I employ a difference-in-difference strategy, which I esti-
mate as follows: 
 
(2) 𝐹𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 = 𝛽 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑦 + 𝜃 𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 + 𝜌 (𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑑𝑦 × 𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠) +  𝛾 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝜹 +  𝜀 
 
where, in addition to the variables from Equation 1, Class is an indi-
cator equal to one for putative class actions and Shady×Class is an 
interaction term equal to one for putative class actions filed after 
Shady Grove. I now use the entire Administrative Dataset, rather 
than only the cases coded as involving class allegations. Thus, there 
are two observations per district per month: one for putative class ac-
tion filings in that district in that month, and one for all other filings. 
This allows me to use the non-class-action cases as a control group 
against which to compare the change in filing rates after Shady Grove.  
Column 1 of Table 4 presents OLS regression estimates for Equa-
tion 2. Note that for the diff-in-diff specification, the coefficient of in-
terest is the coefficient for Shady×Class, not Shady. The estimated 
effect of Shady Grove is large, but not statistically significant. Column 
2 presents the results of the negative binomial regression, and Col-
umns 3 and 4 report the results for the Southern District only. For 
these latter three columns, the estimates effects of Shady Grove are 
highly statistically significant (although implausibly large). 
In reporting regression estimates for the Administrative Dataset, I 
have focused exclusively on estimates of the effect of Shady Grove on 
original filings. Given the relatively small numbers of removed class 
actions in the sample, I am reluctant to draw inferences from specifi-
cations that rely on removal numbers to estimate the effect of Shady 
Grove. Thus, the results for the Administrative Dataset that I report 
examine the effect of Shady Grove on original filings only. Unreported 
results of regressions on removals (available from author) broadly con-
firm the predictions for removal rates, although many of the estimates 
are not statistically significant. 
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TABLE 4: DIFF-IN-DIFF REGRESSION RESULTS,  
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION CASES, ADMINISTRATIVE DATASET51 
Model (1) OLS (2) NB (3) OLS (4) NB 
Scope All NY All NY SD NY SD NY  































District FE Y Y NA NA 
Constant 23.79 (2.072)**  
59.40 
(3.164)**  
N 176 176 44 44 
 
I now turn to the Complaints Subset. The number of cases in the 
Complaints Subset clearly involving both statutory damages and class 
action allegations was quite small: fourteen to be exact. But because 
the Complaints Subset contains information on both class-action alle-
gations and statutory damages claims, it permits two approaches to 
the difference-in-differences methodology.  
First, one can look at putative class actions, and compare those 
with and without statutory damages claims. The prediction for origi-
nal filings would be that statutory damages class actions would rise 
relative to all class actions after Shady Grove. The reverse would be 
true for removals. Rows (1) and (3) in Table 5 do this for original fil-
ings and removals, respectively.  
51 Note: * and ** denote statistical significance at the 5 percent and 1 percent 
levels, respectively. OLS indicates ordinary least squares regression and NB 
indicates negative binomial regression. For negative binomial regressions, 
marginal effects are reported. 
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Second, one can look at cases with statutory damages claims, and 
compare those with and without class action allegations. The predic-
tion for original filings would be that statutory damages class actions 
would rise as a share of all statutory damages cases after Shady 
Grove. The reverse prediction would apply to removed cases. Rows (2) 
and (4) in Table 5 do this for original filings and removals, respective-
ly. 
 
TABLE 5: DIFF-IN-DIFF STATISTICS,  
COMPLAINTS SUBSET 
  Dec. 2008– Mar. 2010 
Apr. 2010– 
Sept. 2010 
    
(1) Original Jurisdiction Cases  with Class Allegations 14 4 
 Share with Statutory  Damages Claim 64% 75% 
    
(2) Original Jurisdiction Cases  Claiming Statutory Damages 10 3 
 Share with Class Allegations 90% 100% 
    
    
(3) Removed Cases with Class  Allegations 6 0 
 Share with Statutory  Damages Claim 33% -- 
    
(4) Removed Cases Claiming  Statutory Damages 10 1 
 Share with Class Allegations 20% 0% 
    
 
Rows (1), (2), and (4) show shifts after Shady Grove consistent with 
the predictions. Row (3) does not allow a comparison of data to predic-
tion, but the reason is telling: as noted above, within the scope of the 
cases in the Administrative Dataset, no class actions have been re-
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moved since Shady Grove. Overall, the patterns of case filings within 
the Complaints Subset reinforce the findings based on the Adminis-
trative Dataset.52  
CONCLUSION 
Courts and commentators have long assumed that vertical forum 
shopping results when federal courts apply the Erie Doctrine in ways 
that preference federal rules. Prior to this paper, however, no empiri-
cal study had quantified the changes in forum shopping behavior 
caused by a court decision applying the Erie Doctrine. I study changes 
in filing patterns of cases likely to be affected by the Shady Grove de-
cision and find evidence of large shifts in the patterns of original fil-
ings and removals in federal courts in New York. 
While the existence of vertical forum shopping has scarcely been 
doubted, its extent has not been systematically studied, and evidence 
regarding the magnitude of vertical forum shopping activity can in-
form the debate about the merits of the many facets of the Erie Doc-
trine. I conclude by noting three key limitations of this study and op-
portunities for further inquiry. 
First, I have examined only the effect of a single decision on verti-
cal forum shopping. Whether future decisions, Federal Rules, or stat-
utes will have similar effects remains an open (and potentially very 
important) question. It is worth noting that in some ways, Shady 
Grove may represent the “worst case” scenario for vertical forum 
shopping, in that it presents a situation in which forum choice is max-
imally sensitive to the vertical choice-of-law rule. Section 901(b) is un-
usual in that it uniformly benefits plaintiffs and its application or non-
applications changes the stakes of a lawsuit by orders of magnitude. 
Other rules implicating the Erie Doctrine may not have so stark con-
sequences.53 
52 A final piece of evidence emerges from the Complaints Subset, although it 
is merely anecdotal in character. Prior to Shady Grove, a few class action 
complaints explicitly disclaimed that they were seeking statutory damages 
under New York law. See No. 09-cv-03219 (S.D. N.Y. filed Apr. 2, 2009) (“[N]o 
penalties, liquidated damages or punitive damages, whether statutory or oth-
erwise, are sought by plaintiff for himself or on behalf of the class in this ac-
tion, and any such relief is expressly waived.”); No. 09-cv-00759 (S.D. N.Y. 
filed Jan. 29, 2009) (“Plaintiff does not seek liquidated damages under the 
NYLL on behalf of the Rule 23 class.”). Needless to say, no such language has 
appeared since Shady Grove. 
53 Consider, for example, the New York rule governing review of jury awards 
that was the subject of Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 
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Second, this study used only federal court data. Data from the 
state courts would be a useful check on inferences drawn from pat-
terns in federal court data. The relative inaccessibility of most state-
court data, however, remains an impediment to ambitious projects in 
this area. 
Third, and most importantly, a full consideration of forum shop-
ping also requires quantifying the scope and scale of the response of 
horizontal forum shopping to decisions applying the Erie Doctrine. In-
deed, a central criticism of the Erie Doctrine has been that it seeks to 
discourage vertical forum shopping, but it ignores its effects on hori-
zontal forum shopping.54 Examining patterns of forum shopping 
across state courts, however, requires the collection of (relative to fed-
eral court data) less accessible state court data, and careful considera-
tion of the fact that horizontal forum shopping requires the considera-
tion of as many as fifty-one alternative forums; vertical forum shop-
ping requires considering only two. This is a serious challenge for fu-
ture research. 
 
(1996). New York Civil Practice Law and Rules Section 5501(c) gives courts 
the power to “determine that an award is excessive or inadequate”—a stand-
ard that could help the defendant or the plaintiff, depending on the case. 
54 See note 8. 
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